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Abstract
It is commonly agreed that the government is more likely to step in and rescue some
troubled companies labeled as “Too-Big-to-Fail” or “Too-Interconnected-to-Fail”.
Since there is no formal contract between these companies and the government, this
potential intervention is referred to as an implicit government guarantee. We propose a
new approach of assessing and estimating the implicit government guarantee and
analyze whether it is reflected in the CDS spreads. We define the implicit government
guarantee for a given company as the probability that the government will bail it out in
case of a default. Although the company’s size affects the likelihood of the
government intervention, we find that the financial industry membership is a more
important factor. Furthermore, we find that the implicit government guarantee is
priced into the CDS spreads. The government guarantee for the large companies
reduces the CDS spread by about 16.11 bps and for the small companies only by about
3.73 bps. Similarly, for the financial industry we find that the government guarantee
reduces the CDS spread by about 76.29 bps and for the non-financial industry only by
about 7.50 bps.

JEL Classification: G28, G10, C13.
Keywords: Bailout, Implicit Guarantee, Too-Big-to-Fail, CDS Spread
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1. Introduction
Failure of some financial and non-financial firms may come at a very high cost to the
society and have spillover effects across all sectors of the economy. To avoid crisis propagation,
the government is likely to step in and rescue certain firms deemed “Too Big”, “Too Important”,
or “Too Interconnected” to fail. Since companies do not pay for the possibility of being bailed
out by the government who does not clearly indicate whether or not it will intervene, it can be
considered an implicit government guarantee. The implicit government guarantee may vary from
one firm to another depending on the characteristics of the firm, like the firm size, the sector, and
the connection with the overall economy. Government propensity to intervene also changes
across time. One of the side effects of the implicit government guarantee to the firm is that it
may lead to the distorted perception about the company’s risk of default by investors. The
expectation that the government will intervene to protect the firm from failure biases investors’
expectation about company’s risk of default downward. The broadly used indicator of the level
of company’s perceived default risk is the CDS spread. The credit default swap (CDS) is the
contract that protects the CDS buyer against the default of the referenced company. The CDS
spread is the premium paid by the CDS buyer to the CDS seller for such protection. Since the
CDS spreads could be affected by the implicit government guarantee, they might not fully reflect
the underlying default risk of the firm. This has certain implications both from the regulators’
and the investors’ perspectives.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we propose a new way of estimating the
implicit government guarantee. The implicit government guarantee remains a public policy
concern because it may involve transfer of resources from the government to the bailed out
companies and, as the financial crises of 2007-2009 showed, the costs to the taxpayers and the
society in general could be very high. Therefore, estimating the implicit government guarantee
2

continues to be an important matter. Second, we explore the relationship between the CDS
spreads and the implicit government guarantee. Our findings in this area have important
implications, for example, for the estimation of the default probability and the amount of the
regulatory capital.
The recent global financial crisis sparked a particular interest in estimating the value of
the implicit government guarantee and a number of papers attempted to measure it using
different approaches. One group of papers (see, for example, Noss and Sowerbutts [2012], Baker
and McArthur [2009], and Li, Qu, and Zhang [2010]) relates implicit government guarantee to
the cost of funding. They argue that in the presence of implicit government guarantee firms enjoy
reduced cost of funding and a reduction in the cost of funding reflects the size of the implicit
government guarantee. The actual strategy used for computing the government subsidy varies
depending on the study. For example, Baker and McArthur [2009] use the difference in the
funding costs between small and large US banks before and after TARP as an estimate for the
subsidy. The main problem with this approach is that it makes an implicit assumption that only
large financial institutions receive government support. Ueda and di Mauro [2012] and Haldane
[2010] estimate the value of the government subsidy to the financial institutions based on the
expectations of government support embedded in the company’s credit ratings. Credit rating
companies publish “individual” and “support” credit ratings. “Individual” rating assesses
company’s strength on a stand alone basis, whereas “support” rating incorporates the probability
that the company will receive government support. The implicit government guarantee is
estimated as a difference between bank’s cost of funding implied by the “support” credit rating
and the cost of funding implied by the “individual” credit rating. The general criticism of the
rating based approach is that it is subject to credit rating agency’s judgment regarding company’s
creditworthiness whereas credit rating agencies have been know to make mistakes in the past, for
3

example, in rating structured securities. Another group of papers (see, for example, Gapen
[2009], Lucas and McDonald [2009], and Oxera [2011]) attempts to measure the implicit
government guarantee by using the contingent claims analysis. They represent the value of the
implicit government guarantee as a put option on the firm’s assets with the strike price equal to
the firms’ default barrier. The firm defaults when the value of the firm’s assets falls below some
threshold (e.g. promised payment on the debt) at some future time. If at maturity of the option
the firm’s assets value is above the default barrier, then the option is not exercised. However, if
the firm’s assets value falls below the threshold, then the option is exercised and its payoff is
equal to the difference between the strike (the default barrier) and the value of the firm’s assets.
The implicit government guarantee is estimated as the expected value of the put option payoff.
The contingent claims approach requires modeling the dynamics of a firm’s future assets’ values.
For example, Gapen [2009] uses Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model to compute the
value of the implicit government guarantee to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The shortcoming of
the Black-Scholes-Merton model is that it assumes that the firm’s (log) asset values are normally
distributed which precludes the possibility of sudden changes in the firm’s asset values. Both
Lucas and McDonald [2009], and Oxera [2011] extend Black-Scholes-Merton model to
incorporate the possibility of jumps in asset prices and investigate a wider range of parameter
values. The main problem with the contingent claims approach is that it is very sensitive to the
underlying assumptions and the model tends to get very complex as more realistic assumptions
are made.
In this paper we propose a different methodology of estimating the implicit government
guarantee. We define the implicit government guarantee as the probability that the government
will bail out a firm facing default. To estimate the probability of the government intervention we
use the Logit model which we apply to a set of 1209 bankrupt and bailed out companies between
4

2000 and 2010. Then for a sample of companies with publicly available CDS spreads, we
construct a government guarantee variable and investigate its relationship with the CDS spreads.
Since the government guarantee reduces the risk of company’s default, we expect the CDS
spreads to be lower when the probability of the government intervention is high, that is we
expect to find a negative relationship between the CDS spreads and the government guarantee
variable. Our definition of the implicit government guarantee differs from the previous studies
mainly in that it is simple, more intuitive and provides a clear interpretation. For instance, we can
define the full government guarantee as a probability of one and no government guarantee as a
probability of zero. By focusing on the value of the government guarantee other studies make it
strongly dependent on the company’s financial health. Companies in high default risk situation
will see the value of their contingent claims increase even if the behavior of the government does
not change. Our empirical analysis shows that, although the company’s size affects the
likelihood of the government intervention, the financial industry membership is a more important
determinant. Furthermore, we find that the implicit government guarantee is indeed priced into
the CDS spreads and the relationship is negative. The government guarantee for the large
companies reduces the CDS spreads by about 16.11 bps and for the small companies only by
about 3.73 bps. Similarly, for the finance industry we find that the government guarantee reduces
the CDS spreads by about 76.29 bps and for the non-finance industry only by about 7.5 bps.
We also provide some practical implications of the relationship between the government
guarantee and the CSD spreads both from the investors’ and the regulators’ perspectives. As the
CDS spreads are often used in the finance industry to estimate the probability of default (PD) and
the amount of the regulatory capital, we suggest that some adjustments should be used to account
for the fact that the risk levels in the CDS spreads are based on the expectation of potential
government intervention. In fact, the PD implied from the CDS spreads may be lower than the
5

actual PD without government intervention. Therefore, we believe that a PD model should
control for such possibility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our methodology
and the data set for estimating the government guarantee. Section 3 lays out the framework for
analyzing the relationship between the implicit government guarantee and the CDS spreads and
describes the CDS dataset along with the control variables we use in our analysis. Section 4
presents and summarizes our empirical findings. Section 5 provides further implications of
government guarantee, while section 6 concludes.
2. Estimation of the Implicit Government Guarantee
We present the methodology used to estimate the implicit government guarantee before
describing the dataset we use in this step.
2.1. Methodology
Government guarantee is a concept frequently used to describe the government
intervention, but measuring it is a difficult issue. As the government makes no explicit
commitment to rescue the firm in a default situation, the ex-ante assessment of this guarantee is
challenging. We define the government guarantee as the probability that the government will
step in and rescue a company in distress. To predict the probability of the government
intervention we use the Logit model. The Logit model provides a way to describe a relationship
between several independent variables and a binary dependant variable, expressed as a
probability. As suggested by the literature and to keep the model parsimonious, we use the
company size and the dummy variable indicating whether or not the firm belongs to the finance
industry as explanatory variables. We have also experimented with a few other explanatory
variables and different models specifications (see Table 2) and chose the more parsimonious
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model which happen to be model 2. To predict the probability of the government intervention we
fit the data to the following Logistic function:

g 

Where,  g –

exp(  0   s lasset   f Dum _ Finance )
1  exp(  0   s lasset   f Dum _ Finance)

(1)

the probability that the government will step in and rescue the
distressed company (government guarantee);

lasset –

the natural logarithm of the total assets measured via their
accounting value;

Dum_Finance –

the dummy variable indicating whether the company belongs to the
financial industry or not;

After we estimate the above logistic equation, the resulting values are used in conjunction
with the company size and its financial industry membership to construct a government
guarantee variable for each of the companies that we use in our subsequent research.
2.2. Government Guarantee Data
To estimate the implicit government guarantee we use the set of 1209 companies. This
data set includes both bankrupt and bailout companies over the period from 2000 to 2010. We
use the list of bankrupt companies from UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database.1 We
define the bailout companies as all firms bailed out by the government from 2000 to 2010. Any
bailout in our study involves an injection of government money. The list of such companies is

A sample of bankrupt companies’ data can be found on the website: http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/ and to obtain a full
list, an email can be sent to the website author.
1
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available from ProPublica’s website.2 As presented in Table 1, we have 884 bankrupt
companies; 13.57% of them are from the finance industry. Our data sample also includes 325
companies bailed out by the government; 93.54% of them are the financial institutions. The
correlation between the finance dummy variable and the bailout dummy variable is 75.48% and
the correlation between the assets size variable and the bailout dummy is 35.96%.
3. Relationship with the CDS spread
With the implicit government guarantee, investors adjust their perception of the
company’s risk of default. To understand whether the implicit government guarantee affects the
investors’ perception of the company’s risk of default, we explore the relationship between the
government guarantee variable constructed in the previous section and the CDS spreads. The
CDS spread is a premium that must be paid by a protection buyer to the protection seller
annually over the life of the contract, expressed in basis points. Since the CDS spread is a good
proxy for the level of the company’s default risk, we expect it to be negatively related to the
level of the implicit government guarantee.
3.1. The CDS Spread Regression Specification
To relate the CDS spreads to the implicit government guarantee we use a panel
regression. The panel regression is a method typically used to analyze multi-dimensional data.
Since our data set includes both cross sectional and time series data, the panel regression is a
suitable procedure. For our analysis we chose the constant coefficient panel regression model
which is an OLS regression on a pooled data. In our regression we include the government

2

For the list of government bailout companies follow the link: http://www.propublica.org/special/governmentbailouts. Here, bailouts are defined by specific programs (e.g. TARP) through which the government provides
financial help to prevent companies from default.
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guarantee variable as well as additional firm-specific and macroeconomic control variables
described in the next section:
CS i ,t   0   g  g ,i ,t 1   f Firm i ,t 1   m Macrot 1  u i ,t

Where, πg,i,t-1

(2)

the implicit government guarantee;

Firmi,t-1

firm-specific variables; and

Macrot-1

macroeconomic variables.

We define the CSi,t as a relative CDS spread of the company i at time t.3 The relative CDS
spread is computed by taking the midpoint between the bid and the ask quotes for the firm and
dividing it by the five-year T-bond rate. The main rational for such definition of the relative CDS
spread is that the CDS spread is approximately the difference between the corporate bond yield
and the risk-free rate. Note that all the explanatory variables are lagged by one time period (i.e.,
one day). This is done to avoid simultaneity problem. We first run the regression with only the
government guarantee variable. Then, we add various firm-specific control variables, such as
equity volatility, firm credit ratings, leverage, and various macroeconomic variables as suggested
by the empirical literature.

3

We use the relative CDS spread instead of the absolute spread in order to control for the risk-free rate over which
the spread is implicitly based. While the absolute CDS spread should provide a good estimate of the risk level
across firms at a given point in time, from a time series perspective, the level of the risk-free rate may affect the
spread, as investors tend to make a tradeoff between corporate bonds and treasuries. For the same corporate risk
level, investors will require a larger spread to switch to corporate bonds when treasury rate is larger. For instance,
let’s suppose that for a given company on day 1 the risk-free rate is 0.2% and the CDS spread is 1%, while on day 2
the risk-free rate is 5%. Assuming that the underlying risk level for that company remains the same for these two
days, an investor who on day 1 was indifferent between 0.2% interest rate on treasury and 1.2% yield on corporate
bond, will more likely prefer 5% interest rate on treasury to 6% yield on corporate bond. This will push the yield
higher and the spread (which follows the difference with the treasury rate) will increase. The relative CDS spread is
a way to adjust for this time varying effect of the risk-free rate, while remaining equivalent to the absolute CDS
spread in cross-section. One may think of a linear adjustment and assume that the treasury rate as a regressand is
sufficient, however, we believe that a proportional adjustment is more appropriate.
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3.2. CDS Data
Our CDS data sample consists of the US companies listed on Bloomberg as of May 2010.
We use daily data for the period from January 2000 through May 2010 and we focus on 5-year
CDS contracts. The CDS data were available for 1,421 companies in nine industry segments.
However, not every company offered information about all other independent variables. Out of
1,421 filings, only 363 offered insight into their historical CDS spreads as well as all other
independent variables. In our analysis we used only complete listings, so our final sample
consists of 363 firms. Out of these firms, about 10% come from the finance industry. Note,
companies that offered limited CDS data were included into the data sample, therefore, the
resulting data set is unbalanced.
3.3. Firm Specific Variables
In our regressions we use a number of firm specific control variables that can potentially
explain the variation of the CDS spreads.
1. Equity Implied Volatility.
Zhang, Zhou and Zhu [2009] find that volatility risk alone predicts about 50% of the
variation in the CDS spread levels. Furthermore, Cao, Yu and Zhong [2010] find that putoption implied volatility dominates historical volatility in explaining the time-series
variation in CDS spreads. In our study we use the average daily implied volatility of the
firm call and put options available from Bloomberg as a proxy for volatility. We expect it
to be positively related to the CDS spreads because higher volatility increases probability
of firm’s default.
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2. Leverage
We compute the leverage ratio as:
Total Liabilities
Total Assets

The data was obtained from COMPUSTAT. Since accounting data is only available at the
quarterly level, we use linear interpolation to obtain daily data. Just like equity return,
leverage can be used as an indicator of firm’s financial health. We expect positive
relationship between firm’s leverage and the CDS spreads.
3. Credit Ratings
Credit ratings reflect general credit worthiness of the company and its ability to make
payments. In our regressions we use a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
company’s credit rating is A- or higher, and 0 if it is below. The credit rating data was
collected from Bloomberg. We use ratings provided by Standard & Poors rating agency.
Whenever the ratings by S&P are not available, we use the ratings by Moody’s. We
expect negative relationship between the CDS spreads and company’s credit rating.
4. Liquidity Risk
The liquidity risk can be thought of as an ability to trade large quantities of securities
quickly without causing significant changes in the market prices. We compute the
liquidity risk as the CDS bid-ask spread divided by the mid-value of the bid and ask. Bidask spread is the most widely used proxy for the liquidity risk. Security is considered to
be liquid if it has small bid-ask spread. The theoretical literature on whether liquidity
should have a positive or negative effect on the CDS spreads is ambiguous. For example,
11

Tan and Yan [2007] find that relative CDS spreads tend to increase with the bid-ask
spread. Acharya and Johnson [2007] find weak negative relationship between the CDS
spreads and the relative bid-ask spread. More recently, Pires, Pereira and Martins [2011]
find that the CDS premiums increase with the absolute bid-ask spreads and decrease with
the relative bid-ask spreads.
3.4. Macroeconomic Variables
In our analysis we also control for four macroeconomic variables that can potentially
explain the variations in the CDS spreads. All of our macroeconomic data were obtained from
Bloomberg. We discuss each of these variables individually:
i.

Treasury rate
In our analysis we use a series of 5-year Treasury rates. The theoretical literature on
whether the spot interest rates should have a positive or negative effect on the CDS
spreads is ambiguous. Longstaff and Schwartz [1995] find that credit spreads are
negatively related to interest rates because higher interest rates reduce probability of
default which in turn reduces the credit spreads. Negative relationship was also found by
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin [2001] and Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo [2009].
However, high interest rates can also be related to tightened monetary policy. For
example, Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu [2009] find that short term interest rates have significant
positive effects on the CDS spreads which they connect to changes in monetary policy.

ii.

Short-term interest rate
We use a 6-month LIBOR rate and its effect on the CDS spreads is ambiguous due to the
same reasoning as for the Treasury rate.
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iii.

Slope of the treasury yield curve
We compute the slope of the treasury yield curve as the difference between a10-year rate
Treasury rate and a 2-year Treasury rate. The slope of the yield curve is an indicator of
expectation of future interest rates. The expected effect of the slope on the CDS spreads
is ambiguous. The slope can be considered an indicator of the overall economic health. If
the term structure has a positive slope, this is considered to be an indicator of “good
times”. If this is the case the relationship between the slope and the CDS spreads should
be negative. Significant negative relationship between the slope of the yield curve and the
CDS spreads was found, for example, by Cao, Yu, and Zhong [2010]. However, the
positive slope of the yield curve can also be connected to the economic environment with
rising inflation and tightened monetary policy. In this case the relationship between the
slope and the CDS spreads will be positive. Significant positive relationship between the
slope of the yield curve and the CDS spreads was found, for example, by Zhang, Zhou,
and Zhu [2009].

iv.

S&P 500 daily return
We use closing values of S&P500 index to compute S&P500 daily return. Since higher
market returns are related to improved market conditions, we expect negative relationship
between index returns and the CDS spreads.
Expected signs on the coefficients of the regression of the relative CDS spreads against

the described explanatory variables are summarized in Table 4.
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3.5. Summary Statistics
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the CDS spreads and explanatory variables used in
the CDS regressions. Due to missing observations, we have to deal with unbalanced panel data.
The number of firms with representative number of observations varies depending on the
variable. The portion of the finance companies in our CDS data sample is about 10% and about
39% of the firms have credit rating of A- or higher. The average size of the company is small,
with about $16,800 million in total assets on average. The average CDS spread is 152.16 basis
points with large standard deviation. The mean leverage for all companies is about 66% and
average equity volatility is about 38%.
4. Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis follows the steps defined above. We investigate the implicit
government guarantee results first, and then analyze its relation with the CDS spreads.
4.1. Implicit Government Guarantee
Consistent with the common belief, we find that both the firm’s size and its finance
industry membership are related positively to the implicit government guarantee (see Table 2).
Analyzing the size effect on the financial and non-financial industry, we find no evidence of a
significant difference between the two (see Table 2, Model 1). The best model specification is
Model 2, which estimates the government guarantee based on the size variable and the dummy
variable of finance industry membership, and therefore, this is the specification we use in our
further analysis.4

4

The choice of model 2 is justified by its parsimony. Although model 1 has a slightly higher pseudo-R2, a test
comparing both models shows that the difference is not significant enough to justify the inclusion of the additional
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We construct the implicit government guarantee variable for the sample of 363 firms. The
average probability of the government bailout for all firms between year 2000 and 2010 is
0.1155 (see Table 5). However, the average government guarantee varies significantly depending
on whether the firm belongs to the finance industry or not. We find that the average government
guarantee for finance firms is 0.8279, whereas for non-finance firms it is only 0.0181. The
government guarantee also varies by creditworthiness of the company. We find that companies
with higher credit ratings are slightly more likely to be bailed out by the government. The same
result holds for both finance and non-finance companies. Additionally, we observe that the
government guarantee depends on company’s size with large companies being more likely to
receive the government bailout (see Figure 1). This result holds for both finance and non-finance
firms.
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Figure 1: Average implicit government guarantee by firm size, finance membership, and firm
rating.

variable. Moreover, the size and the finance membership variables display significant relation as evident from their
respective t-statistics.
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Figure 2 analyzes the evolution of the implicit government guarantee across time for all
companies and separately for finance and non-finance firms. We observe that there was a
downward shift in the probability of the government bailout after the latest financial crisis. This
effect is more profound for non-financial firms. For financial firms we observe some decrease in
the implicit government guarantee in 2007-2008 and an increase in 2009. Our data sample is
dominated by small non-financial firms. Many similar firms failed and were not bailed out by the
government during the latest financial crisis. Most of the firms that received government
subsidies were financial firms. This is consistent with the high probability of the government
bailout for the financial firms and low probability for the non-financial firms that we observe.
The relative stability of the bailout probability of finance companies may seem
counterintuitive. In the political environment of 2007-2008 the debate about the end of “TooBig-to-Fail” led some investors to lower their expectations about the probability of government
intervention. Furthermore, letting Lehman Brothers collapse sent a negative signal that weakened
the government guarantee. At the same time the government passed a bailout plan to save the
financial system. This somewhat mitigated the drop in probability of government intervention for
financial companies, even though the overall probability decreased. This result is particularly
interesting in the sense that it confirms that during the crisis the concept of “Too-Big-to-Fail”
was questioned, while, at the same time, the financial companies remained more likely to be
bailed-out.
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Figure 2: Average implicit government guarantee across time for all firms, finance and nonfinance firms.
4.2. The CDS Spread Regressions
Our main findings from the regressions that relate the CDS spreads to the implicit
government guarantee and other firm specific and macroeconomic variables are reported in
Table 6. Model 1 is a base line regression of the CDS spreads against the implicit government
guarantee, model 2 adds the firm-specific control variables to the base model, model 3 adds
macroeconomic control variables to the base model, model 4 adds all of the control variables to
the base model, and model 5 analyzes the effects of the business cycle. Empirical results show
that relative CDS spreads are strongly negatively related to the implicit government guarantee.
This result holds across all model specifications and the effect remains strong even after
including all of the control variables. This means that the higher the likelihood of the government
17

to step in and rescue the troubled company, the less the company is viewed as risky and the
lower the price of the default risk associated with its bonds.
The effects of all the control variables are consistent with the general intuition and
expectations based on relevant literature. All firm specific variables are highly significant in any
model specification. The equity volatility coefficient is positive, which is in line with Zhang,
Zhou and Zhu [2009] who found that volatility is the main driving factor of the CDS spreads.
The leverage coefficient is also positive which is consistent with the Merton [1974] framework
that predicts higher vulnerability of a firm when its leverage ratio increases and approaches
unity. As expected, the credit ratings are negatively related to the CDS spreads indicating that
firms with higher credit ratings have lower CDS spreads.
Finally, we find that the liquidity coefficient is positive demonstrating that the firm’s
illiquidity increases the CDS spreads. Coefficients associated with the interest rates and the slope
macroeconomic variables are all negative and highly significant in all model specifications. Both
the short term interest rate represented by the Libor rate and the five-year T-bond rate are
negative related with the CDS spreads, which is consistent with Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis
[2005], Longstaff and Schwartz [1995] and other papers who found that an increase in the
interest rates reduces company’s default probability which, in turn, reduces the credit spreads.
The coefficient of the slope variable is also negative which is consistent with the interpretation of
the slope variable as an indicator of “good times”. Finally, the S&P 500 return coefficient is
negative, just as expected, but insignificant.
To relate the government guarantee to the business cycle, specifically, how the
government actions affect the CDS spreads during the economic crisis, we introduce a dummy
variable to account for the changes after January 2007. The results in Tables 6 show a stronger
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effect of the government guarantee on the CDS spreads after this date, suggesting that just before
or during the crisis investors price the government guarantee more.
To analyze the industry and the size effect on the CDS spreads we split our data sample
into financial and non-financial firms and into small and large firms. To split the dataset into the
large and small companies we used the cutoff value of lasset at 9.9214, which is our data set
median. The average value of the lasset variable for the “small” data set is 8.7767 and the
average lasset value for the “large” data set is 11.3550. The regression results are reported in
Table 7. It shows that the government guarantee variable is significant for all four regressions
and the rest of the control variables (except for the S&P500 return variable) are all highly
significant and have expected signs. The effect of the government guarantee is larger for the
large companies. To get the actual contribution of the government guarantee to the CDS spreads,
we can multiply the regression coefficients by the average government guarantee for the data
sample and then by the average five-year T-bond rate. The government guarantee for the large
companies reduces the CDS spread by about 16.11 bps and for the small companies only by
about 3.73 bps. Similarly, for the finance industry we obtain that the government guarantee
reduces the CDS spread by about 76.29 bps and for the non-finance industry only by about 7.50
bps. This suggests that the size of the company (Too-Big-to-Fail) affects the CDS spreads mainly
within the financial industry. As financial firms are usually more connected with the whole
economy, this can be seen as the Too-Interconnected-to-Fail implication.
5. Other Implications of the Implicit Government Guarantee and its Relationship with the
CDS Spreads
For a company the gain from the government intervention goes beyond the cash it
receives for its rescue. The company will have a direct benefit from its own bailout and the
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indirect benefit from the rescue of the system. When appropriate, the government intervention
eventually creates additional value for the system. For instance, Veronesi and Zingales [2010]
estimate that the U.S. Government intervention in the financial sector, which was announced in
2008, increased the value of the banks’ financial claims by $131 billion at a cost to taxpayers of
$25 -$47 billion with a net benefit between $84 and $107 billion. Previously, O’Hara and Shaw
[1990] found that the public announcement by the Comptroller of the Currency in 1984 that 11
largest banks were “Too-Big-to-Fail” increased valuation of these banks by 1.3% on average and
decreased valuation of those banks suspected not to be in that group.
5.1. Investors Perspective
Ex-ante, the estimate of the dollar value of the government guarantee for a given firm
should account for both direct and indirect benefits. While the direct gain can be inferred from
the amount used to bailout the company, it is difficult to estimate the indirect gain as it includes
systemic factors and the interconnection between the companies. In efficient markets the overall
benefit of the government guarantee should be reflected in the CDS spreads.
Our approach can help estimate the dollar value of the implicit government guarantee for
bondholders using the relationship between the CDS spread, the probability of default, and the
bond yield.5 When the government guarantee becomes explicit (e.g. following a bailout plan
announcement), the impact on the probability of default can be derived using the risk neutral
implied volatility. For instance, Veronesi and Zingales [2010] estimate that the announcement of
the 2008 bailout decreases the default probability of eight US biggest financial institutions on
average by more than half, with Morgan Stanley as the biggest beneficiary.

5

For the details about the link between the CDS spread, the probability of default, and the bond yield, see Hull
[2012].
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While the bondholders extract significant gain from the government intervention through
the reduction of the CDS spreads, it is less likely the case for the shareholders as the government
maintains a share of the company at a cheap price during the process. An implication of this is
that an equity portfolio can be hedged by bond related products to mitigate the risk in case of a
bailout.
Our results show strong relationship between the state of the economy and the impact of
the government guarantee on the CDS spreads. We find that after January 2007, investors
strongly price the likelihood of the government to step in. As noted above, this may be due to the
increase in indirect benefits as any potential bailout will be large and involve many companies in
the system. This finding is another indication in favor of appropriate diversification between
equity and bonds, especially using products from the finance sector which is more likely to be
rescued in case of troubles.
5.2. Regulator Perspective
The implicit government guarantee poses a serious issue to regulators as it may lead to a
moral hazard problem associated with the management of “Too-Big-to-Fail” and “TooInterconnected-to-Fail” companies. Although the expectation that the government will intervene
has a positive impact on the financial system as it reduces the risk of bankruptcy and increases
the enterprise value, the cost is usually supported by the tax payers.
Another implication of the relationship between the government guarantee and the CDS
spread is for the regulatory capital whose estimation is based on the assessment of the default
risk. Implying the default risk of a company from the CDS spreads incorporates the implicit
government guarantee. This can lead to an underestimation of the actual probability of default
(without government intervention). As the regulators should protect both the Wall Street and the

21

Main Street, having an estimate of the risk of default without government intervention at the
expense of tax payers is more appropriate. Therefore, probability of default implied from the
CDS spreads should be adjusted to account for potential government intervention. Although the
actual steps for such adjustment are beyond the scope of this paper, we provide some insights for
this exercise.
6. Conclusion
After providing a formal intuitive definition of the implicit government guarantee, we use
a simple and well elaborated approach to estimate it. Unlike other papers that assess the implicit
government guarantee in terms of its value, we define it as the likelihood of the government to
step in and rescue a troubled company. Using a unique sample of data on bailout and bankrupt
companies, we estimate a logistic function to characterize the implicit government guarantee for
any company in relation with its size and finance industry membership. In the second step we
relate the CDS spreads to the implicit government guarantee, and control with the traditional
variables.
Empirical results show that the size of the company is secondary in the decision of the
government to bail it out. The main decisive factor is whether or not the firm belongs to the
finance industry. Although companies with high ratings are more likely to be rescued, their
advantage over low rated companies is very small. We also find that the implicit government
guarantee is priced in the CDS spreads, especially of the financial companies, and therefore, the
firm’s probability of default implied by the CDS spreads may be biased.
An important implication of our research is related to the regulatory capital which, when
implied from the CDS spreads, should be adjusted to account for the implicit government
guarantee. How to perform such adjustment and how to relate this new measure of the
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government guarantee to the actual value of the bailout with its relation to the business cycle are
challenging issues which will be addressed in our future research.
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Variables definitions
Variables

definition

Gvt. guarantee

Probability of the government to step in and rescue the firm from default

Dum_Bailout

Dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm is bailout, and 0 if not

Dum_Finance

Dummy variable taking value 1 for finance firm, and 0 for non-finance firm

cds spread

Basis points paid as a premium to cover five-year corporate bond

relative cds spread

The CDS spread divided by the five-year T-bond rate

dum2007

Dummy variable taking value 1 after January 1st, 2007, and 0 before

lasset

The natural logarithm of the total asset of the firm

Equity volatility

The average daily implied volatility from the firm call and put option

Leverage

The total liability divided by the total asset

Liquidity risk

The Bid-Ask spread of the CDS spread divided by the mid-value of Bid and Ask

Dum_Rating

Dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm is rating A- or more, and 0 if it is below

Equity price

The closing market price of the equity

SP500 index

The closing value of the SP500 index

Libor rate

The six month LIBOR rate

Five-year T-bond rate

The five-year rate on government bond
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Table 1: Summary statistics for bailout and bankrupt firms in relation with the industry (finance
or not) and their size
Panel A: Distribution of bankrupt and bailed out firms by industry.
Dum_Finance
NonDum_Bailout
Finance
Finance
No
764
120
86.43%
13.57%
97.32%
28.30%
Yes

Total

Total
884
100.00%

21
6.46%
2.68%

304
93.54%
71.70%

325
100.00%

785

424

1209

Panel B: Summary statistics for variables used in the estimation of the government guarantee.
Dum_Bailout
Dum_Finance
lasset

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

1209
1209
1162

0.2688
0.3507
6.9743

0.4435
0.4774
1.4759

Min

Max

0
1
0
1
5.1120 12.7005

Panel C: Correlation coefficients.

Dum_Bailout
Dum_Finance
lasset

Bailout

Finance
Industry

lasset

1
0.7548
0.3596

1
0.4017

1
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Table 2: Logit regression of the variable “Dum_Bailout” for the estimation of the probability of
the government intervention (Government guarantee) using the sample of bailout and bankrupt
firms over the last decade (2000 – 2010)
Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

7.2194***
[3.85]

5.1975***
[13.81]

4.2416***
[6.74]

4.5236***
[18.38]

lasset

0.4362*
[1.78]

0.1643**
[2.49]

lasset × Dum_Finance

-0.2883
[1.14]

Dum_Finance

Model 5

0.5431***
[10.84]
0.1463**
[2.20]

Constant

-7.5506***
[4.17]

-5.6524***
[9.91]

-4.5591***
[12.83]

-3.5940***
[16.25]

5.0664***
[13.54]

Pseudo R2

0.5599

0.5590

0.5578

0.5035

0.1088

1209

1162

Observations
1162
1162
1162
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3: Summary statistics
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

absolute cds spread

431,084

152.16

352.96

4.83

89102.50

relative cds spread

385,615

60.22

173.96

1.01

19153.18

Gvt. guarantee

918,465

0.10

0.24

0.01

0.88

dum2007

933,660

0.36

0.48

0.00

1.00

Dum_Finance

933,660

0.10

0.30

0.00

1.00

lasset

918,465

9.73

1.64

4.38

16.74

Equity volatility

849,241

38.15

20.89

6.38

478.04

Leverage

918,465

0.66

0.18

0.04

1.84

Liquidity risk

431,084

0.12

0.08

-1.49

1.80

Dum_Rating

706,932

0.39

0.49

0.00

1.00

SP500 index

872,784

1184.24

195.86

676.03

1565.18

Libor rate

783,601

2.63

1.81

0.10

6.88

Five-year T-bond rate

873,822

3.83

1.15

1.26

6.81
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Table 4: Expected signs on the coefficients of the regression the relative CDS spread against
explanatory variables.
Variable

Expected Sign

Gvt. guarantee

Negative

Equity volatility

Positive

Leverage

Positive

Dum_Rating

Negative

Liquidity risk

Ambiguous

Five-year T-bond rate

Ambiguous

Libor rate

Ambiguous

Slope

Ambiguous

SP500 index

Negative

Table 5: Average implicit government guarantee by industry and credit ratings.
All Firms

Non-Finance
Firms

Finance Firms

Low ratings

0.0460

0.0167

0.7943

High ratings

0.1990

0.0210

0.8354

All

0.1155

0.0181

0.8279
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Table 6: Robust OLS regression of the relative CDS spread on government guarantee, firm
characteristics and some macro-variables. Independent variables are delayed by one lag (day)

Gvt. guarantee

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

-90.5153***

-33.0911***

-27.6380***

-23.8139***

-21.5670***

(119.33)

(44.04)

(69.22)

(34.04)

(32.52)

3.7128***

3.5261***

3.5279***

(80.04)

(70.33)

(70.27)

-31.5696***

-34.0109***

-33.9273***

(71.02)

(74.04)

(73.90)

128.2403***

130.5102***

130.3980***

(59.76)

(59.48)

(59.49)

82.1113***

100.7275***

99.1654***

(18.29)

(26.13)

(26.06)

-17.5405

-42.958

-42.4033

(0.54)

(1.56)

(1.54)

-10.6544***

-15.0732***

-14.6825***

(30.29)

(45.00)

(43.16)

-59.5017***

-36.4757***

-36.2104***

(52.72)

(45.58)

(45.28)

-83.8283***

-14.3732***

-14.7554***

(91.69)

(22.32)

(22.94)

Equity volatility

Dum_rating

Leverage

Liquidity risk

SP500 return

Libor rate

Slope

Five-year T-bond rate

Gvt. guarantee × dum2007

-7.5533***
(7.49)

Constant

73.5576***

-163.3195***

452.9352***

-25.6303***

-25.4407***

(176.86)

(54.48)

(84.27)

(6.20)

(6.16)

Observations

302625

234641

292166

228163

228163

R-squared

0.0154

0.4293

0.1226

0.4406

0.4406

Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 7: Robust OLS regression of the relative CDS spread on government guarantee, firm
characteristics and some macro-variables. Independent variables are lagged by one day.
Size

Industry

Small Comp

Large Comp.

Finance Comp.

Non-Fin Comp.

-9.7705***

-18.9982***

-23.8361***

-108.5005***

(4.34)

(20.33)

(7.75)

(19.36)

4.3437***

3.0799***

2.8611***

3.7446***

(68.20)

(42.57)

(28.28)

(62.96)

-0.7728

-47.3761***

-72.9921***

-28.8299***

(1.27)

(45.70)

(24.77)

(64.48)

145.7911***

123.7569***

142.1605***

136.0902***

(50.81)

(35.74)

(17.66)

(57.20)

68.5058***

90.8705***

137.4265***

102.0955***

(11.70)

(17.53)

(12.44)

(25.80)

-29.7904

-43.3147

-11.0487

-41.5322

(0.93)

(0.98)

(0.13)

(1.44)

-15.3510***

-15.5319***

-17.2998***

-14.2797***

(36.51)

(30.76)

(15.51)

(39.02)

-35.8695***

-35.6087***

-39.2926***

-35.1857***

(35.34)

(29.43)

(16.67)

(41.29)

-10.5933***

-12.6609***

-5.7037***

-11.4999***

(11.54)

(14.34)

(3.31)

(16.25)

-86.5279***

-2.5271

-8.799

-46.2918***

(13.31)

(0.53)

(1.03)

(9.90)

Observations

108388

119775

25170

202993

R-squared

0.5542

0.3624

0.5416

0.4339

Gvt. guarantee

Equity volatility

Dum_rating

Leverage

Liquidity risk

SP500 return

Libor rate

Slope

Five-year T-bond rate

Constant

Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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